The paper reaches four main conclusions regarding the trading bloc that Japan is reputed to be forming in East Asia and the Pacific.
1
Most appear to agree, however, that a trend toward three blocs is indeed underway.
There is no standardly agreed definition of an "economic bloc." A useful definition might be a group of countries who are concentrating their trade and financial relationships with each other, in preference to the rest of the world. One might wish to add to the definition the criterion that this concentration is the outcome of government policy, or at least of factors that are non-economic in origin, such as a common language or culture.
In two out of the three parts of the world, there have clearly been recent deliberate political steps toward economic integration. In Europe, the previously- 
PART I: IS A TRADE BLOC FORMING IN PACIFIC ASIA?
We must begin by acknowledging the obvious: the greatly increased economic weight of East Asian countries in the world. The rapid outward-oriented growth of Japan, followed by the four East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) and more recently by some of the other ASEAN countries, is one of the most remarkable and widely-remarked trends in the world economy over the last three decades. But when one asks whether a bloc is forming in East Asia, one is presumably asking something more than whether the economies are getting larger, or even whether economic flows among them are increasing. One must ask whether the share of intra-regional trade is higher, or increasing more rapidly, than would be predicted based on such factors as the GNP or growth rates of the countries involved.
Adjusting Intra-regional Trade for Growth Pronouncements that a clubbish trade bloc is forming in the region are usually based on figures such as these. But the numbers are deceptive.
One would be led to several conclusions regarding trade blocs if one thought these statistics were relevant.
There is an increasing bias toward intra-regional trade in most parts of the world, especially the European Community and East Asia, (ii) the highest level of intra-regional bias occurs in the European Community, and (iii) the highest increasing trend has taken place in East Asia. Intra-regional trade shares such as those reported in the first three rows of Table 1 are misleading, however, if they lead to such conclusions.
We shall see that the second and third conclusions are incorrect.
If one allows for the phenomenon that most of the East Asian countries in the 1980s experienced rapid growth in total output and trade, then it is possible that there has in fact been no movement toward intra-regional bias in the evolving pattern of trade. The increase in the intra-regional share of trade that is observed in Table 1 The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between pairs of countries in a given year. We have 63 countries in our data set, so that there are 1,953 data points (=63x62/2) for a given year in which the data set is complete. A large part of the apparent bias toward intra-regional trade is certainly due to simple geographical proximity.
Indeed Krugman (1991b) suggests that most of it may be due to proximity, so that the three trading blocs are welfareimproving "natural" groupings (as distinct from "unnatural"
trading arrangements between distant trading partners such as the United Kingdom and members of the British Commonwealth).
Although the importance of distance and transportation costs is clear, there is not a lot of theoretical guidance on precisely how they should enter.
We experiment a bit with functional forms. We also add a dummy "Adjacent" variable to indicate when two countries share a common border.
The basic equation to be estimated is:
0.
The last four explanatory factors are dummy variables. The goal, again, is to see how much of the high level of trade within the East Asian region can be explained by simple economic factors common to bilateral trade throughout the world, and how much is left over to be attributed to a special regional effect.
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The practice of entering GNPs in product form is empirically well-established in bilateral t rade regressions.
It can be easily justified by the modern theory of trade under imperfect competition.
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In addition there is reason to believe that GNP per capita has a positive effect, for a given size: as countries become more developed, they tend to specialize more and to trade more. It is also possible that the infrastructure necessary to conduct trade --ports, airports, etc. --becomes better-developed with the level of GNP per capita.
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3 , and 4. We found all three variables to be highly significant statistically (> 99% level). The coefficient on the log of distance was about -.56, when the adjacency variable (which is also highly significant statistically) is included at the same time. This means that when the d istance between two non-adjacent countries is higher by 1 per cent, the trade between them falls by about .56 per cent.
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We tested for possible non-linearity in the log-distance term, as it could conceivably be the cause of any apparent Hemisphere appear to be.
That still leaves the possibility of special Japanese influence in the region through monetary or financial effects, as may be implicit in the phrase "yen bloc." We now turn from trade to a brief consideration of finance.
PART II. JAPAN'S INVESTMENT IN THE REGION
In the case of financial flows, proximity is less important than it is for trade flows. For some countries the buying and selling of foreign exchange and highly-rated bonds is characterized by the absence of significant government capital controls, transactions costs or information costs. In such cases, there would be no particular reason to expect greater capital flows among close countries than distant ones.
Rather, each country would be viewed as depositing into the world capital pool, or borrowing from it, whatever quantity of funds it wished at the going world interest rate. Thus even if we could obtain reliable data on bilateral capital flows (which we cannot), and whatever pattern they happened to show, such statistics would not be particularly interesting.
Tokyo's Influence on Regional Financial Markets
Many Asian countries still have substantial capital controls, and financial markets that are in other respects less than fully developed. Even financial markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, the most open in Asia, retain some minor frictions. Where the links with world capital markets are obstructed by even small barriers, it is an interesting question to ask whether those links are stronger with some major financial centers than with others. This question is explored econometrically elsewhere, by looking at interest rates.
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We find that, over the period 1982-92, U.S. interest rates have had a rising influence, at the expense of Japanese interest rates, on some English-speaking countries of the Pacific Rim: Australia and New Zealand. But we also find a shift of influence from the United States to Japan in determining interest rates in some East Asian countries. The trend is highly significant in the case of Indonesia, somewhat less so for Korea, and positive but not significant for Malaysia and Singapore. In the case of Indonesia, there is evidence that the increasing Japanese influence may be coming via an increased link between the rupiah and the yen. For the other countries, it is harder to distinguish such a currency effect.
Foreign Direct Investment
We now briefly consider direct investment. Many observers of Asia have concluded that Japan's establishment in neighboring countries of mines, factories, infrastructure, and other facilities, is a key attribute of efforts to form an economic bloc. Indeed, there is no question that direct investment frequently goes hand in hand with trade. Proximity clearly matters in the case of direct investment, in a way that we would not expect for securities. This is in part because much of direct investment is linked to trade, in part because linguistic and cultural proximity matter for direct investment.
Here there is not much point looking at rates of return, because the data are nowhere near as available or as reliable as for interest rates, and because there is no realistic null hypothesis entailing perfect arbitrage across countries.
Instead we look at quantities. We look only at aggregate quantities; unquestionably some sectors would show more investment links than the average and some less, just as they would if we disaggregated the trade numbers. It has been argued that once one scales the Table 6 figures for GNP among the host countries, an Asian bias to Japanese direct investment might indeed appear. Furthermore, Ramstetter (1991a, p.95-96; 1991b, p.8-9) has forcefully pointed out that the standard Ministry of In short, Japan's direct investment in East Asia is at most keeping pace with its trade.
PART III: CONCLUSIONS
We may draw seven conclusions.
( Japan's direct investment in Pacific Asia has grown, but at most in proportion to its trade in the region. 
Notes
. Those who fear the blocs do so because they think they will tend to be protectionist. Froot and Yoffie (1991) in this volume pursue this logic, and point out some implications of foreign direct investment. Krugman (1991b) argues in favor of the three blocs on the grounds that they are "natural," in a sense explained below. Lawrence's (1991c) argument in favor of blocs is that they can cement politically pro-liberalization sentiment in individual countries. . Reviews of recent developments in regional trading arrangements are offered by Fieleke (1992) and Torre and Kelly (1992) . . E.g., Petri (1992) .
. Examples include Arase (1991), Dornbusch (1989) , Maidment (1989), and Thurow (1922, pp.16,65 . Petri (1991) calls this measure the "double-relative," while Drysdale and Garnaut (1992) and Anderson and Norheim (1992) use similar calculations of "intensity-of-trade indexes." All find that, once one holds constant for growth in this simple way, the existing intra-regional bias in Asia did not increase in the 1980s. . See Deardorff (1984, pp.503-04) for a survey of the (short) subject of gravity equations. Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) have recently applied the gravity model to the question of potential Eastern European trade patterns.
. The list of countries, and regional groupings, appears in an Appendix.
. Details on the data sources, list of countries, groupings, method for computing distances, etc., are available on request.
.. The specification implies that trade between two equal-sized countries (say, of size .5) will be greater than trade between a large and small country (say, of size .9 and .1).
This property of models with imperfect competition is not a property of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage. Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 1.5) . Foundations for the gravity model are also offered by Anderson (1979) and other papers surveyed by Deardorff (1984, pp.503-06) . ..
Thee coefficient on the log of distance was about .8 when the adjacency variable was not included. .. Petri infers, from the data on intra-regional trade shares, a decrease in East Asian interdependence up to the middle of the 1980s, followed by a reversal in the second half of the decade. ..
Others have emphasized the high volume of trans-Pacific trade. But it has been difficult to evaluate such statistics when no account is taken of these countries' collective size. A higher percentage of economic activity will consist of intra-regional trade in a larger region than in a smaller region, even when there is no intra-regional bias, merely because smaller regions tend by their nature to trade across their boundaries more than larger ones. In the limit, when the unit is the world, 100 per cent of trade is intra-"regional." .. Jackson (1991).
.. In tests similar to ours, Wang (1992) , Winters (1991), and Hamilton and Winters (1992) found the ASEAN dummy to reflect one of the most significant trading areas in the world. That they did not include a broader dummy variable for intra-Asian trade may explain the difference in results.
.. The use of the multiplicative form itself changes the results, however. Linnemann (1966) and Wang and Winters (1991) addressed the problem of trade flows so small as to be recorded as zero in another way: by trying the tests with fractions (like .5) of the minimum recordable unit substituted for the zeros. Eichengreen and Irwin (1993) , examining the interwar period, use a third approach: they run the dependent variable (trade) in levels rather than logs, and use TOBIT to truncate negative values.
They find that exclusion of zero values does make a difference to two parameter estimates: the coefficients on income per capita, and adjacency. .. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1993) . .. The estimates with differences in GNP per capita and differences in factor endowments are reported in Tables 4 and 5 , respectively, of Frankel and Wei (1993b) .
.. Petri 1991.
.. The empirical literature on whether Japan is an outlier in its trading patterns, particularly with respect to imports of manufactures, includes Saxonhouse (1989) , Noland (1991) and Lawrence (1991a) , among others. .. The foreign influences on East Asian interest rates are examined in three places, in increasing order of completeness: Frankel (1991) , the second half of the NBER paper of which this article is the first half, and Frankel and Chinn (1992) . These papers also give references to other work on the subject.
